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President Bryan, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Because American constitutional history has been CflSlS
history the absence in the political and legal literature of any
theory of constitutional crisis appears as striking as would
the absence of a condemned man at his execution. One
might speculate about what economics would be like without a crisis theory, or psychology without a body of material seeking to explain the growth and resolution of psychic
tensions. To build such a theory in constitutional study is a
perilous task: and where the Warrens, Corwins, Powells, and
Boudins have feared to tread I do not propose to rush in.
Yet I should like to set down in a tentative fashion some
notes on the relation of constitutional crisis to the democratic
state of today.
There have been three major types of constitutional crisis
in our history. You get one type when there is a sharp discrepancy between the needs of effective government on the
one hand and on the other the limits of tolerance imposed
by the Supreme Court on the policy (generally economic
policy) of the government. You can, if you wish, put it
into somewhat Freudian terms: the id, or driving part of the
governmental psyche, wants desperately to follow certain
lines of action; the superego, or the censor in the shape of the
Supreme Court, says No. If the cleavage between the two
is acute enough, you get breakdown.
The second type of crisis, generally linked to the first,
comes when there is a frontal attack (or counter-attack) on
the judicial power, whether on the part of Congress or the

President, generally (although not necessarily) in order to
make it more responsive to the popular consciousness of the
time. In this sort of crisis the desire for a realignment of
Supreme Court policy clashes with the sense of the need for
retaining judicial independence of political change, and with
the related sense of the Constitution as a basic protection
of our liberties and of the Supreme Court as having a guardian-role toward the Constitution.
The third type comes when the Constitution, in emergencies, is actually stretched beyond its usual bounds, and where
the unwonted stretching, necessary though it may be, raises
questions of the breakdown of the whole constitutional fabric.
This generally occurs in periods of military emergency, as
during the Civil War, the World War, and the present one,
and relates generally to the expansion of Presidential power.
In oversimplified terms, the first may be called an economic
constitutional crisis, because its origin and occasion are economic change and economic policy. The second may be
called a judicial constitutional crisis, because its origin and
occasion are the expansion of judicial power and the threat
to it. The third may be called a war constitutional crisis,
because its origin and occasion are the demands that a war
makes upon executive leadership, with all the dangers that
it involves for civil liberties and political responsibility. All
three are facets of the democratic crisis state.
I don't know whether it is subversive to use the term
"crisis state" to apply to our democracy. I included it one
summer in a catalogue description of a course I was to give
at a university, and I received a polite little note saying that
one of the university authorities questioned the wisdom of
using that phrase. Wisdom or no wisdom, the reality of our
crisis is a fact. It is not something that can be exorcised by
verbal magic. We have on our hands a crisis democracyone that must navigate through the ~hoals and scudding
drifts dangerous to a democratic bark, one which seeks to use
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every aid on its voyage but must cling to the difficult course
of state power without state monopoly of thought or action,
one which must contrive ever new strategies of economic
control and create ever new administrative mechanisms, one
which must somehow survive as a constitutional system while
fighting its enemies without and within, one which must become a planned economy without destroying democratic responsibility and a military state without suppressing civil
liberties. You can, if you will, refuse to use the term "crisis
state." But our ancestors found they could not wipe out the
fact of sex by calling a leg a limb.
We must start with the need for effective government.
The greatness of the Federalist lies not so much, as has been
thought, in the exposition of valid principles of political philosophy. It lies rather in the theme of a government effective
enough to meet the problems it confronts. Many of the political attitudes of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay have been
whittled down by time, and have been converted to the uses
of minority rights rather than majority rule. But the Federalist remains one of the world's great books because, as in
all great literature, its core theme is ever new. And that
core theme is the need for adequate government.
Today a new Federalist could be written, recounting the
changes and chances of our national life, and the new requirements of effective government. It has been remarked that
the Supreme Court is an adjourned session of the Constitutional Convention. There is a sense in which this carries an
ironic freightage. But the irony is not, as we have tended to
suppose, merely in the reference to judicial law-making.
There have been ample instances of a proper place for interpretative creativeness by the Court. "We must never
forget," John Marshall said, "that it is a Constitution we are
expounding." The irony lies in the fact that the Court has
more often used its great power for sterilizing than for fertilizing the materials of American growth. And the irony lies
[ 5]

also in the fact that the Court has claimed for itself alone the
creative potential. The fact is that in every crisis we must
govern with the freshness of eye and the largeness of spirit
of a Constitutional Convention. There are times when we
must act like the Founding Fathers or commit national suicide.

If we really want to live, we'd better start at once to try;
If we don't, it doesn't matter, but we'd better start to die. l
Pan of the problem of democratic survival is constitutional, much of it is political and economic. We cannot continue to draw the sharp boundaries between the two realms
that we have drawn in the past. The fact is that in a constitutional democracy, whatever the reality of the forces involved in the struggle over direction, the rhetoric that the
minority groups will use in opposing changes is always the
rhetoric of constitutionalism. There is an interesting comparison to be drawn here between the situation a half-century ago, in the days of the triumph of Mr. Justice Field,
and the situation today. The conservative Court majority at
that time formed an idea of a rigid economic system that was
best off left alone and that could not be violated; it alone
was identified with constitutionalism. The enemy they were
fighting was "socialism," and anything was socialism that
did not fit into their accustomed economic scheme. The
constitutional crisis of 1935-1938 was the final term in the
proportional sequence of their reasoning. Today a similar
group in the country has fetishized a rigid political system.
To our amateur constitutional lawyers in Congress and out,
that alone is constitutional. The enemy they are fighting is
"dictatorship," and anything is dictatorship that does not
come within their accustomed view of administrative function, presidential power, and the shaping of foreign policy.
Fifty years ago this group stood for inaction in the sphere
1 w. H. Auden, Poems,

p. 42, New York, Random House, 1934.
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of the government of industry. Today it adds inaction in
the fashioning of foreign policy.
The issue is still the adaptability of our constitutional
framework, its adequacy to meet the demands laid upon it.
There are, however, differences between the two situations.
Except in an indirect sense, the struggle today is not one
over economic organization, although it is likely to become
so when the question of the organization of a war economy
reaches-as it may reach soon-a constitutional phase. Thus
far the struggle is mainly over the limits of political action
and the lines of the distribution of power. Another difference is that the force obstructing effective government is no
longer the Supreme Court, which with its present personnel
and in its current doctrinal phase is reasonably ready to
give the green light to expansive programs for domestic and
foreign policy. The obstructive force has come to be located
mainly in Congress, and in areas of the press and particular
interest groups.
But if the accidental factors have changed, the essential
problem of effective government remains. And the aspects
of constitutional crisis in which this problem has at various
times been clothed are worth reviewing.
Some day the full and rounded story of the New Deal
constitutional crisis may be written. To say that, may of
course, be only a pious hope. For the full and rounded
story even of the Jefferson-Marshall constitutional crisis has
not been written, despite the zeal of many of our histOrians.
We have had accounts of Jefferson's attack on the Court,
and accounts of the Court's attack on Jefferson and states'
rights. But we have had no detailed account of each attack
in relation to the other, of both in relation to the economic
factors of a developing industrialism, the political factors of
a new federal structure, and the psychological factors of the
clash between old and new symbols; and finally of all these
factors in the context of an international climate of opinion

that had been created by the world's revolutions of the
eighteenth century.
So too with the New Deal constitutional crisis. We have
had in Alsop and Catledge's The 168 Days, an account of the
legislative battle in a popular vein written from the bias of
critics of President Roosevelt's Court proposal. And former
Attorney General (now Mr. Justice) Jackson has given us, in
his Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, a survey of the Court's
behavior before and after the legislative fight. Justice Jackson's book reads a little like the testimonial of a man who
is sure that the medicine made all the difference in the world
between the feeling before and the feeling after, but is a
little ashamed-being a doctor himself-of being beholden to
what may have been, after all, a somewhat slickly concocted
patent remedy. But we have not yet had, and it may be a
long time before we get, a history of the crisis which sees
it steadily and sees it whole-which relates it to economic
changes, to the class-structure of our society, to the struggle
for political power, to the world crisis, to the psychological
roots of fear and insecurity.
What I set down here is no history: merely a sequence
of reflections on the course and the meaning of a particular
constitutional crisis. Before we can understand the New
Deal crisis, we must understand that it followed on two developments. One was a revolutionary situation in the world
at large, which produced and was produced by economic
dislocation, and which put an enormous strain on our economic and political invention and our national will. The
second was a felt need for decisive action in the economic
realm, for a sort of legislative Blitzkreig, and the development of administrative strategies so considerable that the past
decade may well go down in American history as most significantly that of our administrative revolution.
It was some dim knowledge of the revolutionary situation
in the world at large, and of its bearing on American history, which impelled the Administration to make its rela-
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tively vigorous attempt to seek a solution of the problem of
production and employment by new economic strategies and
administrative controls. It was the unwillingness of the Supreme Court majority to recognize the nature of world economics that led to their following the one tradition of seeing
the Constitution as an inflexible verbal testament, rather than
the other tradition of seeing it as a tool for effective government. 2 Out of this clash between the action of the Administration and the opposition of the Court, an irresistible force
and an immovable object, came the constitutional crisis.
Or perhaps I should put it somewhat differently. We start
with economic breakdown. The Administration makes a
decisive attack on the problem in terms somewhat novel for
America, economically and administratively. The Court an~
swers not by an attack on the problem-insists, in fact, that
it is quite unconcerned with that-but by an attack on the
attackers. This course was taken, as is fairly clear now, not
because of the inherent inelasticity of the Constitution, or
the inevitability of the particular tradition 6f constitutional
interpretation that was chosen, but primarily because of the
inflexibility of the majority's social philosophy. The struggle was joined between effective government and judicial
supremacy.
.\.nd yet again, in stating it thus, the truth is likely to
prove elusive. It would be a mistake to view the Supreme
Court's role wholly in terms of inertia. While the social
philosophy of the majority was a quietist one, their judicial
philosophy was decidedly activist. Their attack on the New
Deal program of social legislation was vigorous in the extreme. (It is worth nothing, in contrast, that while the economic and social philosophy of the current Court majority
is a dynamic one, its judicial philosophy is quietist-that of
judicial tolerance of legislative action.) If we premise some
sort of equilibrium in the attitude of the people, between
2 For the terms used here I am indebted to B. H. Levy, Our Constitution:
Tool or Testament? New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 194I.

their attraction to the idea of necessary legislative change and
their clinging to the traditions of necessary judicial guardianship of individual rights, we may say that the violence of
the Court's attack threw it off its keel, so far as the delicate
balance of public opinion was concerned. The President,
reinforced in public opinion by his election for a second
term, sensed this and counter-attacked the Court with his
proposal for reorganization. But the President too attacked
more violently than he could afford to. He too was thrown
off his keel. And he left himself vulnerable to an onslaught
that, using the Court plan as the immediate target, went far
beyond that target. The varied forces that had been generating opposition, for one reason or another, to the social
philosophy or the political tactic of the Administration were
polarized around this issue. Especially was this true of many
of the liberals, who, while supporting the New Deal, had
unquiet doubts about its seemingly erratic course and the
crudity of its energies: they now had a chance to release
those doubts of a general character under the guise of opposition to a specific break with tradition. And in the course
of the turmoil, over the President's plan, his opponents-liberals, conservatives, and reactionaries alike-were able to reach
deep to the basic fears of the people. For what finally defeated the President's plan was the sense of fear that we were
breaking loose from our moorings in the Constitution and
setting sail for shores unknown. The result is history
The course that the constitutional crisis ran is now fairly
clear, and has been given some precision in Mr. Jackson's
narrative. There were four phases. The first, in 1933 and
1934, was when the Court "hesitated between two worlds,"
upholding some of the state reform legislation but giving no
clear indication of what it would do with the national program. The second was the "nullification" period in 1935
and 1936, in which the Court used its axe freely on national
legislation. The third was the President's reorganization
plan, the struggle over it, and its legislative defeat. And the
[ 10 ]

fourth was the new line of decisions by the Court, indicating a changed orientation, and eventually the fonnation of
a new majority.
Certain questions arise. Could the crisis have been avoided?
The answer must be clearly in the affirmative, unless we
premise on inevitable and determinist relationship between
capitalist economic crisis and a quietist social philosophy on
the part of the Court majority which the later history of the
Court does not bear out. Need the crisis have been as acute
as it was? This is more difficult of answer. One thing is
clear: once the Court acted with the extremism it did, and
once the President's dramatic plan was announced, compromise became extremely difficult. Many who had been
disquieted by the Court's decisions found it necessary now
to suppress their doubts about the Court in their zeal for the
defense of judicial independence. And many who were disquieted about the particular plan of the President found it
necessary to suppress their doubts in their zeal for some sort
of judicial refonn. Once the battle was joined, the alternatives for both groups became absolute. F or one group it became a question of either complete judicial supremacy or
judicial subordination. F or the other it oecame a question _
of either the President's plan or no judicial refonn at all. In
the clash of power politics the desirable direction was transformed into an ideological absolute which had either to be
defeated as a whole or accepted as a whole. Everything
intermediate was squeezed out.
I turn now to a crucial question. How was the constitutional crisis resolved? In answering it we must seek a different answer from what it would be were our question, How
was the political struggle over the Court reorganization bill
resolved, and who was the victor in the legislative battle?
F or the resolution of a constitutional crisis involves not the
detennination of victor and vanquished, but the clearing of
the obstacles that stand in the way of effective government.
Thus there was a shift in judicial philosophy on the Court
[II]

from one militantly opposed to the Administration to one
tolerant of its efforts to resume its attack on the basic economic problems. And that change, as Mr. Jackson tells us,
took place even before the active changes in the personnel
of the Court through resignation and replacement. The
change was made partly as a tactical matter, to help persuade
Congress to vote against the Court bill.
Yet, it would be wrong to say, as Jackson does, that therefore the ultimate change in the Court's attitude was not due
to a change in personnel. For without the actual changes
in personnel that followed, the balance of power would have
remained in the hands of Justice Hughes and Roberts, and the
victory for the New Deal, represented by the Court's shift
in orientation, could not have been consolidated. The first
period of uncertainty and hesitation that opened the constitutional crisis might have been repeated. And it is significant
that the recent Supreme Court policy indicates that what
change there has been in the judicial philosophy of Justices
Hughes and Roberts has not been so essential as to take, them
out of the category of frequent dissenters from the current
Court majority on economic cases.
Thus the crisis was resolved in two stages: first, when the
threat of Court reorganization resulted temporarily in a shift
of judicial attitude in the balance-of-power group; and later,
when the way was cleared for changes in the personnel of
the Court. As a result of both there was a return to the
more flexible of the Supreme Court traditions of constitutional interpretation.
There are several other observations that may be worth
making, and I am the less disinclined to make them because
I have not seen adequate emphasis on them in the literature.
They have to do with the resolution of the crisis. But their
emphasis is not with the legislative struggle or the court personnel or the doctrine or philosophy of the judges: rather
with popular consciousness and class tensions in our society.
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If the Court bill had been passed and we had in that way
(through the forced substitution or addition of judges)
achieved our present Court liberalism, it would have been
difficult for the country to accept that liberalism with the
lack of social tension that now characterizes our attitude toward the Court. The Big Industry groups would have felt
it to be an unparalleled exercise of arbitrary power. Even
the large majority mass would have found it difficult to
accept the results, however these results might have comported with the effective government they wanted. For
even the majority fears to get the right things in the wrong
way. And enough of it had by that time become convinced
that the Court plan was the wrong way.
As it happened, the Big Industry groups were stopped from
the sort of vociferous and active resistance which they would
have offered to the decisions of the new Court if, in their
minds, judicial independence had been destroyed through the
"packing" of the Court. So, in a deep sense, it was well that
while the Administration got the brunt of popular attention
in 1933-1935, and the Court's decisions got it in 1935, it
was what happened between Congress and the President that
got the brunt of attention in the 1938 days. The (at least
outward) victory of Congress deflected attention from the
actual resolution of the constitutional crisis through the play
of power politics upon doctrine. The popular mind, which
had been stirred to the depths by the events of the Court
fight, and in which allegiance to effective government had
been aligned against allegiance to judicial independence, was
now allowed to go back to its traditional channels. The people could have their cake and eat it too. As for Big Industry,
it could not eat its cake, but it also could scarcely protest:
for it was its cake, was it not? It had won the fight against
the Court plan. Even Mr. Willkie, in the campaign for his
nomination, was not able, through his well known Saturday
Evening Post article on the new Court orientation, to stir up

resentment against a too-liberal Court that had after all not
been "packed."
Thus what might have meant a more or less serious impairment of the prestige of the Constitution and Court has been
averted. And this has happened largely because the setdement was accomplished within the constitution rather than
outside it. What a theme here for a Thurman Arnold on
the way in which everything turns on the decorous observance of symbols-were not Mr. Arnold himself far too busily
engaged these days in the decorous observance of symbols
to write about them.
But perhaps because of the very fact of the observance of
symbols, the central problem of judicial supremacy has been
left unaffected. F or if and when we again get a court which
believes that social policy must be shaped by a process of litigation we shall run into another major judicial constitutional
cnSIS.

I have spoken thus far of an episode in recent American
history which presented an example of an interlocked constitutional crisis, which was in its first great phase economic
and its second judicial. It is moreover an instance of a completed crisis cycle-one that has run its course, although it
has left a residue of effects.
I turn now to a different type of crisis-what I have termed
the war constitutional crisis. The democratic crisis state,
after weathering pretty well its first (domestic) storm, is now
facing its second (international) storm. It was inevitable,
as we entered into the phase of severe international strain,
that constitutional difficulties should arise. The need for
extraordinary pace and decisiveness in action necessarily
placed strains on the constitutional limits of the state. But
it was also to be expected that those strains would apply not
to the relations between the Administration and the Court,
but between the Presidency and Congress, and that they
would be fought out not in Court decisions but in Congressional debates and the channels of opinion formation.
[ 14]

That is happening now. I do not consider that we are at
present in a state of serious constitutional crisis. I do think
that we are in a state of constitutional expansion which has
crisis elements and potentials. I shall speak later of the broadening by the present Court of the limits of tolerance for social legislation both of the federal government and the states.
Yet while some of our constitutional troops are thus employed in consolidating their victory, the real spearhead of
constitutional expansion must be sought elsewhere-in the
Presidency in wartime.
You will undoubtedly have noted the important new Presidency books that have been 'published this year by Laski,
Corwin, Herring. 3 This concentration on the Presidency
represents a sound instinct, born of a dual outlook: first, a
sense of the need for great leadership in America's hour of
decision; and second, a sense of the difficulties that will be
(and have already been) encountered in the reaching out
for Presidential effectiveness.
I shall not present an analysis of the constitutional aspects
of the Presidency. That has already been done with considerable sharpness and in great detail by Corwin. Again I
want only to set down some reflections on aspects of our
constitutional system in wartime.
One of the difficult but exciting things about the democratic crisis state is that it must carryon under democratic
forms in a world that is abandoning them. And this paradox
becomes particularly acute in wartime. Although I shall not
discuss our foreign policy from the angle of its merits, it is
important to note that we are today committed to full aid
to the anti-Nazi nations. What does that mean in governmental terms? It means we must fulfill the conditions of
modern warfare to survive, just as in the domestic crisis we
3 Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, New York, Harper, 1940;
E. S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, New York University
Press, 1940; E. P. Herring, Presidential Leadership, New York, Farrar &
Rinehart, 1940.
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had to fulfill the conditions of modern economic and administrative strategy to survive. War today is of a dual nature: it is a war of factories and a war of morale. To organize our armament power to aid Britain requires the delegation of vast powers to the Presidency. To mobilize our
factory power will raise further questions of war-industries
control. To deal with morale will raise problems of civil
liberties. But the exacting thing about our situation is that
everything we do in our defense effort is geared to the pace
and scope of the efforts of the fascist powers. In effectand here is the paradox-although not yet at. war, we are
having to operate as if we were fighting a war. Yet, since
we have not declared it, our officials do not have either the ·
legal or the psychological powers they would otherwise
have.
The problem here, as in the crisis of 1935-1938, is again
one of the dominant need of governmental effectiveness if we
are to survive, as against an inflexibility of governmental doctrine and machinery. But the differences are important.
The struggle is not primarily in the economic but in the political realm. The difficulties do not center in the Supreme
Court but in the relation of the President to Congress and
sections of public opinion. The ideological minus-symbols
that are in use are not those of (economic) socialism but
of (political) dictatorship; and the opposite plus-symbols are
not judicial authority but civil liberties and political survival.
The institution of the American Presidency is confronting
the severest test of its whole history. For no matter what
happens in world affairs, the path ahead of us is likely for
some time to be as difficult and stumbling as any we have
taken. And the Presidency will have to bear the brunt of
the burden. For while Congress will have its path cut out to
subject the acts of the President and the administrative and
military arms of the government to the pitiless test of discussion, and the Court will have to draw a perilous line between
public need and private wrong, the great shaping and forma-

l
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tive work must be the President's. That has always been
true in times of crisis in America, but it will be particularly
true in a war crisis of the world era of totalitarianism.
Have we a conception of the Presidency adequate to this
need? Here too, as in the case of the scope of the judicial
power, there are several alternative traditions we can draw
upon. One starts with Jefferson but has generally been associated with the weaker Presidents and the laissez faire executive doctrines: that the President dots the i's and crosses the
t's for Congress, and acts as a sort of tabula rasa on which
"the laws of economics" are written. The other starts with
Jackson and Lincoln and includes Cleveland, Theodore
Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt. I should like
to submit that a conception of Presidential leadership adequate to our needs would have to be based on a conception
of a militant and affirmative democracy. It would draw
upon the second list of names and examples I have mentioned,
but it would set them in the international context of today.
What is that international context? It may seem a far
cry from a discussion of world forces to the American Constitution: but the latter will not be either workable or intelligible from now on except in that context. It is a context of changing technologies of diplomacy and war. It is
a context in which national isolation or neutrality are no
longer possible. It is a context of the breakup of the international order we have known. It is a context in which
only the strong and affirmative state can survive.
In the light of this the Presidency in the democratic crisis
state is likely to extend its power in four areas-first, the
military forces, over which the President is already commander-in-chief. Second, the organization of the war industrial structure. Third, the further extension and co-ordination of the administrative agencies. Fourth, the shaping
of foreign policy.
Of these, the President's control of the military forces is
the least likely to be called in question. Yet this is exactly
[ 17 ]

the point where Lincoln exceeded his powers by taking upon
himself in the early stages, without Congress, the responsibility of getting the country ready to fight a civil war. That
contingency is not likely to arise again unless a Nazi vic-'
tory over England should align against each other the groups
that want to bring our institutions into the orbit of Hitler
and the groups that would fight such an eventuality to the
bitter end. And yet the President, because of the anomaly
of our being at war yet not at war, is today having friction
with Congress in regard to the disposition of the armed forces.
The difference is that what the President as Commander-inchief could have done under a state of war now has to be
done more laboriously as part of the shaping of foreign policy.
Yet even here recent events have shown the President has
broad enough range in negotiations to commit the nation step
by step to a definite foreign policy.
In two of the other three areas there is · likely to be a
good deal less friction before a declaration of war and more
after it. In the area of industrial organization, while the
crucial problems will not immediately be constitutional, we
have learned that questions of property have a way of converting themselves into questions of constitutional power.
In the area of administrative control enough has been done
in an experimental way during the New Deal (for example,
the recent Acheson report) to attenuate the potential difficulties during the war years. Bl).t it is in the area of the shaping of foreign policy, that the great difficulties have already
cropped up and will continue to do so.
There are already many who fear this expansion of power
as dictatorship, and others who welcome it as a departure
from the cumbersomeness of a leaderless democracy. But
surely we need not accept either position. Our task is neither
~o whittle away the necessary power nor to submit blindly
to arbitrary power. Rather is it to give the President the
powers he needs, but encircle them with institutional safeguards, and build into them, in the fashioning and executi.on
[ 18 ]

of policy, those who represent various groups with a real
stake in the fight against totalitarianism.
This will still leave knotty problems-of civil liberties, of
labor's claim, of the competition of political ideas and political policies. Once more the Supreme Court will have
to wrestle with the "clear and present danger" doctrine, in
its application to untried situations.
I say, there will be knotty problems, for several basic reasons. For first, a war or defense emergency brings closer to
each other the political and economic structures of a nation.
The imperatives of production become political imperatives.
The scope of labor choice and bargaining and organization
become questions fraught with immense political importance.
At what point labor is being asked, like any other group,
to serve the nation's interest and at what point it is being
victimized, under the guise of the national interest, by dollara-year men in the government and by army-men who sometimes have no sympathy for labor-those too may be tough
and intricate questions. The safest general course is again
to apply the rule of participation-to ask whether labor has
had a hand in administering the machinery to which it is
being subjected. Second, a war or defense emergency whittles away the line between utterance and action, between
private right and public responsibility, between conscience
and constraint. And third, a war or defense emergency
brings various local communities together in common and
more or less standardized sentiments; and while it infects
them with a central tension, it has rarely the machinery for
keeping their potential vigilantism in check. It is in these
local areas, I think, rather than in the action of the national
government, that most of the civil liberties cases will arise.
And here too the only possible defense against them is the
persistent att.empt to spread a sense of the rule of law and'
the fabric of equality.
I have said above that these will be knotty problems for the
Supreme Court to solve. I have relatively few fears about
[ 19 ]

the quality of their solution. It is not only that I consider
our present Court a great and technically proficient one. It
is also that through all the crises of the past decade-economic,
political, constitutional, international-our democracy has retained the essential fabric of legality, the patient education
of opinion by the government and the responsiveness of the
government to opinion.
This deserves a word. F or we have allowed our thinking
about democracy and dictatorship to become thin, smug, and
superficial. We 'judge them in quantitative terms, as if we
were grocers weighing our potatoes. Dictatorship means
great power, we say; democracy, little power. Dictatorship
means concentrated power, democracy, safely dispersed and
divided power. But to say and think that is to fall victim to
the great tragic fallacy of our age. F or it is not true that
to survive a democracy must be weak. In any forin of government, power must be adequate to the tasks placed on it.
And in any form of government, power must be concentrated as far as may be necessary for survivaL
The crux of the problem must be sought in legal, political,
and economic responsiveness. The Nazi war-lords must by
their very nature be lawless, because if they once admitted
a system of law to which their power would be subject, by
which it would be measured and its arbitrariness checked,
their whole house of cards might fall. The only law they
recognze is the law they declare, just as the only international order they recognize is the order they can enclose
within their iron ring of coercion and terror. And what
goes .for legal responsiveness goes also for political and economic. So long as we can keep our leaders in office or turn
them out at will, so long as jobs are not dependent on state
or party, so long as we can keep open the channels for the
competition of ideas, the democratic crisis state can be at
once decisive and constitutional, strong without sacrificing
the liberties of its people.

[20]
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